The Appellate Judges Speak by Becker, Edward R. et al.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 74 Issue 1 Article 1 
2005 
The Appellate Judges Speak 
Edward R. Becker 
Michael Boudin 
Pierre N. Leval 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edward R. Becker, Michael Boudin, and Pierre N. Leval, The Appellate Judges Speak, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1 
(2005). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol74/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 74
2005-2006

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
VOLUME LXXIV OCTOBER 2005 NUMBER 1
CONTENTS
THE PHILIP D. REED LECTURE SERIES
CITATION OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
PANEL DISCUSSION
THE APPELLATE JUDGES SPEAK ..... Hon. Edward R. Becker, 1
Hon. Michael Boudin,
and Hon. Pierre N. Leval
RESPONSE
THE CITATION OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS ........ Patrick J. Schiltz 23
ESSAY
REFORMING THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE AcT:
DEMOCRACY INDEX RULEMAKING ............. David Fontana 81
ARTICLE
UNDERSTANDING ANTI-DILUTION
PROVISIONS IN CONVERTIBLE
SECURITIES ............................... Michael A. Woronoff 129
and Jonathan A. Rosen
NOTES
"SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I Go?":
THE CURRENT STATE OF PARTISAN
GERRYMANDERING ADJUDICATION
AND A PROPOSAL FOR THE FUTURE ......... JoAnn D. Kamuf 163
DEFINING THE REACH OF THE SECURITIES
EXCHANGE ACT: EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF THE ANTIFRAUD
PROVISIONS ................................ W. Barton Patterson 213
SHOULD PROSECUTORS BE REQUIRED TO
RECORD THEIR PRETRIAL INTERVIEWS
WITH ACCOMPLICES AND SNITCHES? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sam Roberts 257
SEE No EVIL, HEAR No EVIL,
DON'T GET SUED: SHOULD A PRIVATE
CAUSE OF ACTION EXIST FOR A VIOLATION
OF NASD CONDUCT RULE 3010? .............. Amnon Wenger 303
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
VOLUME LXXIV NOVEMBER 2005 NUMBER 2
CONTENTS
SYMPOSIUM
LAW AND THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
EDITORS' FOREWORD ............................................ 345
PANEL 1: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PUBLIC VALUES
THE PLACE OF THE USER IN
COPYRIGHT LAW ................................ Julie E. Cohen 347
WHAT CONTRACTS CANNOT Do:
THE LIMITS OF PRIVATE ORDERING IN
FACILITATING A CREATIVE COMMONS ...... Niva Elkin-Koren 375
THE PERFECT STORM: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND PUBLIC VALUES .............. R. Polk Wagner 423
PANEL IH INFORMATION REGULATION AND THE
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
SOME REALISM ABOUT THE FREE-SPEECH
CRITIQUE OF COPYRIGHT .................... David McGowan 435
SOCIETY'S SOFTWARE .......................... Beth S. Noveck 469
and David R. Johnson
PANEL III: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS INSTITUTIONALIZATION
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ................... Fabien Gglinas 489
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE &
DEVELOPMENT: THE STATE OF PLAY ........ Daniel J. Gervais 505
PANEL IV: MARKET REGULATION AND INNOVATION
LEGAL AND TECHNICAL STANDARDS IN
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT
TECHNOLOGY .................................... Dan L. Burk 537
SIZE MATTERS (OR SHOULD) IN
COPYRIGHT LAW ................................ Justin Hughes 575
INNOVATION IN COMPLEMENTARY
INTERNET MARKETS ........................ Mark R. Patterson 639
POLICING THE SPECTRUM COMMONS ........... Philip J. Weiser 663
and Dale N. Hatfield
PANEL V: RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY ON THE INTERNET
SHORTNESS OF VISION: REGULATORY
AMBITION IN THE DIGITAL AGE ........... Susan P. Crawford 695
PANEL VI: THE COEXISTENCE OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY
FOURTH AMENDMENT CODIFICATION AND
PROFESSOR KERR'S MISGUIDED CALL
FOR JUDICIAL DEFERENCE .................... Daniel J. Solove 747
CONGRESS, THE COURTS, AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR SOLOVE ............. Orin S. Kerr 779
ARTICLE
SCHOOL CHOICE TO ACHIEVE
DESEGREGATION ................................. Goodwin Liu 791
and William L. Taylor
NOTES
IT'S THE PROSECUTION'S STORY, BUT
THEY'RE NOT STICKING TO IT:
APPLYING HARMLESS ERROR AND JUDICIAL
ESTOPPEL TO EXCULPATORY POST-CONVICTION
DNA TESTING CASES .......................... Hilary S. Ritter 825
BROADCAST INDECENCY REGULATION IN THE
ERA OF THE "WARDROBE MALFUNCTION":
HAS THE FCC GROWN Too BIG
FOR ITS BRITCHES? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Brian J. Rooder 871
PROTECTING ONLINE AUCTION SITES FROM THE
CONTRIBUTORY TRADEMARK LIABILITY STORM:
A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO THE
TiFFANY INC. V. EBAY INC. PROBLEM ........ Fara S. Sunderji 909
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
VOLUME LXXIV DECEMBER 2005 NUMBER 3
CONTENTS
COLLOQUIUM
ETHICS IN CORPORATE REPRESENTATION
INTRODUCTION: THE POST-ENRON IDENTITY
CRISIS OF THE BUSINESS LAWYER .......... William H. Simon 947
THE DISCRETE ROLES OF
GENERAL COUNSEL ...................... Deborah A. DeMott 955
THE BANALITY OF FRAUD: RE-SITUATING
THE INSIDE COUNSEL AS GATEKEEPER ......... Sung Hui Kim 983
OCCUPATION CODE 541110: LAWYERS,
SELF-REGULATION, AND THE IDEA
OF A PROFESSION ............................ Jonathan Macey 1079
FROM CLUB TO MARKET: THE EVOLVING
ROLE OF BUSINESS LAWYERS ................. Geoffrey Miller 1105
TEACHING ENRON ....................... Milton C. Regan, Jr. 1139
RESISTANCES TO REFORMING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: THE DIFFUSION
OF QLCCs .................................. Robert Eli Rosen 1251
A MODEL OF TIME-INCONSISTENT MISCONDUCT:
THE CASE OF LAWYER MISCONDUCT ........ Manuel A. Utset 1319
ARTICLE
BEARING THE CROSS ............................ Tom Lininger 1353
NOTES
TYING THE BRAID OF SECOND-PARENT
ADOPTIONS-WHERE DUE PROCESS
MEETS EQUAL PROTECTION ........... Christopher Colorado 1425
SUSPENDING HABEAS CORPUS: ARTICLE I,
SECTION 9, CLAUSE 2, OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND THE WAR ON TERROR ...... Tor Ekeland 1475
ALL IN A DAY'S WORK? STATUTORY AND
OTHER FAILURES OF THE WORKERS'
COMPENSATION SCHEME AS APPLIED
TO STREET CORNER DAY LABORERS ............ Juno Turner 1521
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
VOLUME LXXIV MARCH 2006 NUMBER 4
CONTENTS
SYMPOSIUM
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE STEVENS
INTRODUCTION ...................... William Michael Treanor 1557
LEARNING ON THE JOB .................... John Paul Stevens 1561
PANEL I: CRIMINAL JUSTICE
JOHN PAUL STEVENS,
HUMAN RIGHTS JUDGE ................. Diane Marie Amann 1569
LESS Is BETTER: JUSTICE STEVENS AND
THE NARROWED DEATH PENALTY ......... James S. Liebman 1607
and Lawrence C. Marshall
JUSTICE STEVENS, THE PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE, AND THE JURY ................ Nancy S. Marder 1683
Is DATA MINING EVER A SEARCH UNDER
JUSTICE STEVENS'S FOURTH AMENDMENT? ... Joseph T. Thai 1731
PANEL I: ANTITRUSTINTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
TRADEMARK DILUTION, SEARCH COSTS,
AND NAKED LICENSING ...................... Daniel Klerman 1759
COMPETITION AND MARKET FAILURE IN
THE ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE
OF JUSTICE STEVENS ........................... Alan J. Meese 1775
JUSTICE STEVENS AND MARKET
RELATIONSHIPS IN ANTITRUST ............. Mark R. Patterson 1809
THE GENERATIVITY OF SONY V. UNIVERSAL:
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LEGACY OF JUSTICE STEVENS ............. Pamela Samuelson 1831
PANEL III: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW/STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
SOLVING THE PUZZLE OF MEAD AND
CHRISTENSENl WHAT WOULD
JUSTICE STEVENS Do? ................... Amy J. Wildermuth 1877
THE MISSING STEP OF TEXTUALISM ......... Abner S. Greene 1913
SKEPTICISM AND EXPERTISE:
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE EEOC ......... Melissa Hart 1937
JUSTICE STEVENS, JUDICIAL POWER,
AND THE VARIETIES OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION ........... Kenneth A. Manaster 1963
COMPETING PRESUMPTIONS ABOUT
STATUTORY COHERENCE .................... John F. Manning 2009
PANEL IV: FEDERALISM
JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT IN Two DIMENSIONS:
CHARTING AREA AND INTENSITY IN THE
DECISIONS OF JUSTICE STEVENS ...... Allison Marston Danner 2051
and Adam Marcus Samaha
FIGHTING FEDERALISM WITH FEDERALISM:
IF IT'S NOT JUST A BATrLE BETWEEN
FEDERALISTS AND NATIONALISTS,
W HAT IS IT? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . David J. Barron 2081
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN FEDERALISM ....... Thomas H. Lee 2123
JUSTICE STEVENS'S THEORY OF
INTERACTIVE FEDERALISM ................ Robert A. Schapiro 2133
PANEL V: FIRST AMENDMENT/VOTING RIGHTS
JUSTICE STEVENS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,
AND THE VALUE OF EQUAL
MEMBERSHIP ........................ Christopher L. Eisgruber 2177
THE PARTISAN OF NONPARTISANSHIP:
JUSTICE STEVENS AND THE LAW
OF DEMOCRACY ............................. Pamela S. Karlan 2187
THE PRAGMATIC POPULISM OF
JUSTICE STEVENS'S FREE
SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE ................ Gregory P. Magarian 2201
TREATING RELIGION AS SPEECH:
JUSTICE STEVENS'S RELIGION
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE ........... Eduardo Moiss Peflalver 2241
EQUAL FAVORITISM UNDER THE LAW AND
INTELLIGENT DESIGN IN REDISTRICTING ......... Terry Smith 2259
PANEL VI: EQUAL PROTECTION
BACKWARD-LOOKING LAWS
AND EQUAL PROTECTION:
THE CASE OF BLACK REPARATIONS ........ Daniel A. Farber 2271
"THERE IS ONLY ONE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE": AN APPRECIATION OF
JUSTICE STEVENS'S EQUAL
PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE .............. James E. Fleming 2301
DISPARATE IMPACT, DISCRIMINATION,
AND THE ESSENTIALLY CONTESTED
CONCEPT OF EQUALITY ................... George Rutherglen 2313
EQUAL PROTECTION UNMODIFIED:
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS AND THE
CASE FOR UNMEDIATED CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION ........................... Andrew M. Siegel 2339
NOTES
GENERAL JURISDICTION AND INTERNET CONTACTS:
WHAT ROLE, IF ANY, SHOULD THE ZIPPO
SLIDING SCALE TEST PLAY IN
THE ANALYSIS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eric C. Hawkins 2371
THE HEALTH ACT'S FDA DEFENSE TO
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A GIFT TO
DRUG MAKERS OR TO THE PUBLIC? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Elissa Levy 2425
COMMENT
EQUITY UP IN SMOKE: CIVIL RICO,
DISGORGEMENT, AND
UNITED STATES V. PHILIP MORRIS.... Christopher L. McCall 2461

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
VOLUME LXXIV APRIL 2006 NUMBER 5
CONTENTS
ESSAY
TEXT AS TRUCE: A PEACE PROPOSAL FOR THE
SUPREME COURT'S COSTLY WAR OVER
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT ............... Andrew B. Coan 2511
ARTICLES
STOCK EXCHANGES AT
THE CROSSROADS ....................... Andreas M. Fleckner 2541
AN EXCUSE-CENTERED APPROACH TO
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE .......................... David Gray 2621
NOTES
REEVALUATING THE DEBATE SURROUNDING
THE SUPREME COURT'S USE OF
FOREIGN PRECEDENT .................... Osmar J. Benvenuto 2695
SAY HELLO AND WAVE GOODBYE:
THE LEGITIMACY OF PLAIN VIEW SEIZURES
AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE HOME ........... Evan B. Citron 2761
GONE BUT NOT FORGOTTEN:
How SECTION 212(C) RELIEF CONTINUES
TO DIVIDE COURTS PRESIDING OVER
INDICTMENTS FOR ILLEGAL REENTRY ....... Anthony Distinti 2809
ATTACKING THE DOG-BITE EPIDEMIC:
WHY BREED-SPECIFIC LEGISLATION
WON'T SOLVE THE DANGEROUS-
DOG DILEMMA ........................... Safia Gray Hussain 2847
LISTENING TO THE DISABLED:
END-OF-LIFE MEDICAL DECISION
MAKING AND THE NEVER COMPETENT ........ Eric C. Miller 2889
SECTION 2401(B) RECONFIGURED:
IRWIN V. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
LEADS TO THE RIGHT RESULT FOR THE
WRONG REASONS ............................... Elana Wexler 2927

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
VOLUME LXXIV MAY 2006 NUMBER 6
CONTENTS
LECTURE
The Robert L. Levine Distinguished Lecture Series
A NEW U.N. FOR A NEW CENTURY.... Anne-Marie Slaughter 2961
ESSAY
PROPERTY METAPHORS AND
KELO V. NEW LONDON:
Two VIEWS OF THE CASTLE ........... Eduardo M. Pefialver 2971
ARTICLES
MISERY AND MYOPIA: UNDERSTANDING
THE FAILURES OF U.S. EFFORTS TO
STOP HUMAN TRAFFICKING .............. Jennifer M. Chac6n 2977
THE SMALL LAWS: ELIOT SPITZER AND THE
WAY TO INSURANCE MARKET REFORM.. Sean M. Fitzpatrick 3041
NOTES
ENGLAND'S CHILLING FORECAST:
THE CASE FOR GRANTING DECLARATORY
RELIEF TO PREVENT ENGLISH
DEFAMATION ACTIONS FROM
CHILLING AMERICAN SPEECH ...... Raymond W. Beauchamp 3073
THE FORUM NON CONVENIENS DISMISSAL
IN THE ABSENCE OF SUBJECT-MATrER
JURISDICTION ................................. David W. Feder 3147
ASSESSING THE COMPATIBILITY OF
TITLE-IX AND § 1983: A POST-ABRAMS
FRAMEWORK FOR PREEMPTION ........... Debora A. Hoehne 3189
SUBWAY SEARCHES: WHICH EXCEPTION
TO THE WARRANT AND PROBABLE
CAUSE REQUIREMENTS APPLIES TO
SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES OF MASS
TRANSIT PASSENGERS TO
PREVENT TERRORISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Charles J. Keeley III 3231
BURYING THE TRUTH: THE MURDER OF
BELFAST HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYER
PATRICK FINUCANE AND BRITAIN'S
"SECRET" PUBLIC INQUIRIES .......... Joaquin P. Tercerio III 3297
COMMENT
JOHNSON V. CALIFORNIA AND THE
INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF
BATSON CLAIMS .................... Deana Kim El-Mallawany 3333
THE PHILIP D. REED LECTURE SERIES
CITATION OF UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
PANEL DISCUSSION
THE APPELLATE JUDGES SPEAK*
PANELISTS
Hon. Edward R. Becker
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Hon. Michael Boudin
Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Hon. Pierre N. Leval
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
MODERATOR
Professor Patrick Schiltz
St. Thomas University School of Law
Reporter to the Judicial Conference
Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules
PROFESSOR CAPRA:** I would like to welcome you to the panel
tonight on the citation of unpublished opinions. This is presented by the
Philip D. Reed Chair. Our topic tonight is what to do with and how to deal
with unpublished opinions by appellate courts, specifically the merits of
allowing them to be cited by litigants, and more generally the usefulness of
an opinion that is labeled "not for publication." As we will see tonight, the
topic of unpublished opinions has created significant controversy within the
federal courts.
* This Panel Discussion was held on February 17, 2005, at Fordham University School of
Law. The text of the Panel Discussion transcript has been lightly edited.
** Professor Daniel J. Capra is the Philip D. Reed Professor of Law at Fordham University
School of Law.
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We are extremely lucky to have an unbelievable panel to discuss this
question. It is my pleasure to provide a short introduction for each of the
panelists, although it is not really that short because they have done so
much.
I will start with Judge Edward Becker. Edward Becker is a graduate of
Yale Law School. After thirteen years of private practice in Philadelphia,
he was appointed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania in December 1970, so that gives him thirty-four years on
the bench. In January 1982 he was named to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit and he served as Chief Judge from 1998-
2003. If you are down in Philadelphia, you should go to the courthouse to
see the beautiful new Edward R. Becker Lobby of that federal courthouse, a
testament to Judge Becker's impact on the Third Circuit.
In addition, Judge Becker has been active with the Judicial Conference of
the United States, serving as a member or chair of numerous committees
and with the ALl' and ALI/ABA 2 Committee on Continuing Professional
Education. He has written a ton of law review articles.
He has received a number of awards. The most important one that I
know of, and I was happy to be there for that time, was the Edward J. Devitt
Distinguished Service to Justice Award, awarded at a special ceremony at
the Supreme Court and given by Justice Breyer and Senator Specter. He
has an honorary LLD from Temple University.
I guess I would just end this introduction by saying he has affected my
career in a number of positive ways: first, his contributions to the federal
law on evidence are really unparalleled in the federal judiciary, and that is
indicated in the tribute to Judge Becker and his career in the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review. 3 His efforts led to the reconstitution of the
Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, for which I
have the honor of serving as Reporter. When he was Chief Judge, he
appointed me as Reporter to the Task Force on Appointment of Counsel in
Class Actions. And if ever I have an evidence question that I just cannot
figure out, I know I can call Judge Becker. I am particularly touched that
he came here today, as he has not been feeling very well the last few days,
but he wouldn't miss this argument for the world. I know that to be the
case.
Our next panelist is Judge Michael Boudin, Chief Judge of the First
Circuit Court of Appeals. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School, where
he served as President of the Harvard Law Review. He served as a law
clerk to Judge Henry Friendly and then to Justice Harlan. I guess you
couldn't do a whole lot better than that.
1. American Law Institute.
2. American Bar Association.
3. Marci A. Hamilton, Chief Judge Edward R. Becker: A Truly Remarkable Judge, 149
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1237 (2001).
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He was an associate and then a partner at Covington & Burling from
1966-1987. From 1987-1990 he served as Deputy Assistant Attorney
General in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. In 1990 he
was appointed a United States District Judge of the District of Columbia.
After two years as a trial judge, he was appointed to the First Circuit Court
of Appeals, where he has been Chief Judge since 2001.
Judge Boudin is a member of the Executive Committee of the Judicial
Conference and has previously served as a valued member of the Judicial
Conference Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.
Having attended all of those meetings during Judge Boudin's tenure, I
found it remarkable that, among all the stars that were at that table, it was
Judge Boudin's comments that usually had the most impact. He was the
cause of many extra hours of work on my part, I must say, because I knew
that, while I could slide some technical thing past most of the Committee,
he would have me on those. So many pleasant hours of work, Judge.
Judge Boudin has also taught at Harvard and Penn Law Schools,
including the course on evidence. His evidence opinions for the First
Circuit, which I know very well, are particularly thorough, insightful, and
influential, and I am happy to have him here today.
Our third panelist is Judge Pierre Leval, a judge of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. At the time of his appointment in 1993, he was a
United States District Court Judge in the Southern District of New York.
Judge Leval graduated magna cum laude from Harvard Law School,
where he served as Note Editor of the Harvard Law Review. He served in
the U.S. Army in 1959. He was a Law Clerk for Judge Henry Friendly, so
you have a pattern here I guess. Judge Leval was an Assistant U.S.
Attorney in the Southern District of New York from 1964-1968, serving
there as Chief Appellate Attorney from 1967-1968. From 1969-1975 he
was in private law practice at the Cleary Gottlieb firm, and then he joined
the New York County District Attorney's Office in 1975, where he served
as First Assistant District Attorney, subsequently as Chief Assistant District
Attorney. In 1977, he was appointed to the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York.
His medals and honors are unbelievable, but to talk about just a couple of
them: the Donald Brace Memorial Lectureship by the Copyright Society of
the United States and the Fowler Harper Memorial Fellowship of Yale Law
School. We are definitely thankful to have him here to express the Second
Circuit's view on this point.
Our final panelist and our moderator tonight is Professor Patrick Schiltz,
the St. Thomas More Chair of Law at the University of St. Thomas Law
School in Minneapolis.
He graduated magna cum laude from Harvard Law School, where he
served as Editor of the Law Review. He clerked for Judge Antonin Scalia
on the D.C. Circuit and then served as Justice Scalia's first law clerk when
he was appointed to the Supreme Court.
2005]
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Professor Schiltz entered private practice at a major firm in Minneapolis
and then he was appointed to the faculty of Notre Dame. In July 2000,
Professor Schiltz left Notre Dame to become the Founding Associate Dean
of the University of St. Thomas Law School, where he was basically
responsible for starting the school and building the beautiful building,
which, if you are in Minneapolis, I'm sure he would be happy to give you a
tour. It is a wonderful place.
During all of this time he has been a prolific scholar, publishing a
number of important articles, particularly in the area of professional
responsibility. And even more importantly, he serves as the Reporter to the
Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, and it is that Committee's
proposal that starts our discussion tonight.
The format for tonight's discussion is an introduction to the problem by
Professor Schiltz, commentary by each of the judges, then an open panel
discussion, and then we will leave it open for questions.
Now I turn it over to Professor Schiltz.
PROFESSOR SCHILTZ: Thank you.
As Professor Capra said, I serve as the Reporter to the Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules. We are here tonight to talk about an issue
that has been on the agenda of the Advisory Committee since 1991. 4
Fourteen years now this has been on our agenda, and it has become one of
the most controversial issues ever in the history of federal rulemaking.
The issue is the citation of unpublished opinions. What I am going to do
tonight is spend about ten minutes or so introducing the issue and then turn
the floor over to the distinguished judges who are here tonight.
In the last fiscal year, the federal courts of appeals disposed of 27,438
cases on the merits after the submission of briefs. In general, the
dispositions of the appellate courts can be categorized in one of three
categories.
The first category is the dispositions that are accompanied by a published
opinion; that is, an opinion that is published in the Federal Reporter and
that all the circuits would agree is binding precedent. Of the 27,000-plus
cases disposed of last year, only about 5100, less than twenty percent,
resulted in a published opinion.
The second category is dispositions that are accompanied by an
unpublished opinion; that is, an opinion that is not published in the Federal
Reporter and that most circuits regard as not binding on the circuit. Of
course, the phrase "unpublished opinions" is a misnomer, especially now
with the Federal Appendix, because these opinions are published, not only
in the Federal Appendix but in numerous other sources, but it has become a
term of art to refer to these as unpublished opinions, and we will do that
4. The Judicial Conference approved an amended version of Rule 32.1 in September
2005.
[Vol. 74
2005] THE APPELLATE JUDGES SPEAK 5
tonight. Of the 27,000-plus cases that were disposed of last year, more than
21,000, just under eighty percent, resulted in unpublished opinions,
The third category is the smallest; that is, dispositions that are not
accompanied by any opinion. These dispositions are often referred to as
"judgment orders." They are essentially one-line orders where the court of
appeals simply says, "We affirm the decision below, period." The court
does not give any reasons for its action, published or unpublished. Of the
27,000-plus cases disposed of last year, only about 800, or three percent,
were disposed of with judgment orders.
Now, this evening our focus will be on the second category of cases, on
unpublished opinions. I should make it clear up front that we will not be
discussing, at least directly, what is generally referred to as the Anastasoff5
issue. Anastasoff was an opinion of the Eighth Circuit from the year 2000
written by Judge Richard Arnold, in which he held that Article III of the
Constitution requires federal courts to treat all of their opinions, published
or unpublished, as binding precedent.
Anastasoff itself was later vacated as moot and, although it has generated
a lot of debate among judges and scholars, it is not what we are here to talk
about tonight. Instead, tonight we will focus on the citation of unpublished
opinions. To put the matter simply, we are going to discuss whether an
attorney who submits a brief to, say, the Second Circuit, can cite in that
brief an unpublished opinion of the Second Circuit.
This question is not addressed anywhere in the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, it is not addressed in any of the Federal Rules of
Practice and Procedure; instead, it is addressed in the local rules of the
circuits. None of those local rules altogether prohibit the citation of
unpublished opinions. All the circuits allow unpublished opinions to be
cited for what might be called "case-specific reasons." For example, an
attorney wants to argue collateral estoppel or res judicata, or an attorney
wants to argue double jeopardy. All the circuits say that it is okay to cite
unpublished opinions for that.
Where the circuits diverge is in the degree to which they allow
unpublished opinions to be cited for what are called "persuasive reasons."
A party who cites an opinion for its persuasive value cites the opinion for
the same reason that the party might cite the opinion of a district court
judge or a foreign court, not because the opinion binds the federal court of
appeals, but because the attorney hopes that the court of appeals will be
persuaded by the opinion, its reasoning, or its ruling, to rule in a particular
way.
Now, the circuits are divided almost in thirds on this issue, on whether
unpublished opinions can be cited for their persuasive value. Four circuits,
including the Second on which Judge Leval sits, take a very restrictive
approach: Essentially they ban the citation of unpublished opinions for
their persuasive value.
5. Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
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Four other circuits, including the Third on which Judge Becker sits, take
a very liberal approach: They permit the citation of unpublished opinions
pretty much without restriction. So, in these circuits, unpublished opinions
are treated the same as citing state court opinions or law review articles or
newspaper columns or anything else that might inform the court but does
not bind the court.
The other five circuits, which include the First on which Chief Judge
Boudin sits, take a middle approach: Like the Second Circuit, and unlike
the Third Circuit, these circuits do single out unpublished opinions for
unfavorable treatment, but they do not completely bar the citation of
unpublished opinions. Instead, what they generally do is they say to
attorneys, "We discourage you from citing unpublished opinions, but if you
have an unpublished opinion that either addresses an issue that none of our
published opinions do, or addresses it better than any of our unpublished
opinions do, you may cite it." So that is sort of where the courts fall in line
in those three categories.
Now, as I said a moment ago, the issue of unpublished opinions has been
on the study agenda of the Advisory Committee since 1991. It was added
to my Committee's study agenda in 1991 at the behest of the Federal Court
Study Committee, which, after a massive study of the federal courts,
expressed concern, among many, many other things, about the many
problems created by non-publication policies and non-citation rules.6 It
was also added to our agenda at the behest of what was known as the Local
Rules Project, which recommended that unpublished opinions should be
guided by consistent national standards, rather than by the array of
conflicting local rules that I have just described.
After being put on the Committee's study agenda in 1991, this issue
languished there for seven years until 1998, when the Advisory Committee
voted not to pursue the issue, to drop it, to take it off the agenda. The
Committee did so after the Chair of the Committee surveyed the chief
judges of the circuits, and they were almost unanimous, and on the whole
quite passionate, in expressing their opposition to any rulemaking on the
topic of unpublished opinions. So my Committee essentially said, "Fine,
we are not going to even try then."
After about a thirty-month hiatus, the issue of unpublished opinions was
put back on the Advisory Committee's agenda by the Solicitor General of
the United States, who serves as a member of the Committee. And
although the Chair of the Committee at that time and I both argued to the
Committee that it should not proceed with the suggestion because less than
three years earlier the chief judges of the circuits had told us quite
adamantly that they were opposed to rulemaking on this, we were in the
6. Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 7 (2002)
(statement of Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit)
("[N]on-publication policies and non-citation rules present many problems." (internal
quotation omitted)).
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minority, and the Committee decided to go ahead with the Solicitor
General's recommendation.
That eventually resulted in Proposed Rule 32.1, 7 which is available in
your materials. I should stress two things about Rule 32.1.
The first thing I need to stress is it is a very narrow rule. The only thing
Proposed Rule 32.1 does is it says that the circuits have to allow parties to
cite unpublished opinions. The Rule says nothing about what the circuits
must do when those opinions are cited. The Rule explicitly takes no
position on the Anastasoff issue-that is, on the question of whether
unpublished opinions must be treated as binding-and the Rule does not
require any circuit to issue a published opinion, nor issue an unpublished
opinion. Circuits can do what they want. All the Rule says is that the
circuits have to allow these opinions to be cited in the briefs.
The second thing I should stress is that Rule 32.1 is very controversial. It
was published for comment in August of 2003. When the notice and
comment period ended in February of 2004, we had received 513 written
comments on the Rule, the second-most comments received in the history
of federal rulemaking. Not only were the comments notable for their great
number, but they were also notable for their passion. People felt very
strongly. You need only review a few of the comments, comments that
were not infrequently marked by anger, by sarcasm, by apocalyptic
predictions of what would happen if the Rule passed, by ad hominem
attacks on the members of the Committee, and even the Reporter-
JUDGE BECKER: Excuse me, Professor, would you tell the audience
whether there was a notable geographic pattern of the source of the
overwhelming number of the comments?
PROFESSOR SCHILTZ: No, I won't right now.
[Laughter.]
But I have a question-you are anticipating one of the questions I will
ask the panel.
JUDGE BECKER: Well, I will tell everybody. It was from the Ninth
Circuit.
PROFESSOR SCHILTZ: Which we respect and esteem. About seventy-
five percent of all the comments and about eighty percent of the comments
against it came from the Ninth Circuit. More later on that.
To understand the depth of feeling about this, you do not even have to
read the comments; you can just read the dozens of law review articles that
have been published in the last couple years about this issue.
In one recent article, for example, Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth
Circuit, a highly respected judge on the Ninth Circuit and the leader of the
anti-Rule 32.1 forces, compared unpublished opinions-which, remember,
are the official public acts of Article I judges-to sausage that is unfit for
7. Memorandum from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on
Appellate Rules, to Judge Anthony A. Scirica, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice
& Procedure 28-29 (May 22, 2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/app0803.pdf.
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human consumption.8 And he argued that attorneys who cite unpublished
opinions as if they were published opinions are guilty of a particularly
insidious form of fraud on the court.9
Matching heated rhetoric with heated rhetoric, Lawrence Fox, who is a
highly respected attorney and a supporter of Rule 32.1, responded to Judge
Kozinski by saying that the reasons that he and other judges give in
opposition to Rule 32.1 are "heretical," and he even suggested that judges
who bar citation may not be acting ethically.
Now, one reason why this issue has proven so controversial, I think, is
that its supporters and its opponents both start from very different first
principles. They have very different views on what is normal or natural,
and therefore they have very different views about who is it that, if you
will, has the burden of proof, who has the case to prove here.
Those who favor Rule 32.1 argue, for example, that government officials,
including judges, who are government officials, generally cannot bar
citizens from saying things, particularly things about the official public
actions of those government officials, without some compelling reason. Or
they say that, generally speaking, the government cannot tell attorneys how
to represent their clients, again without compelling reason. So, for
supporters of Rule 32.1, it is the opponents who have the burden of proof; it
is the people who support local restrictions on the citation of unpublished
opinions who have to come up with the compelling reasons for doing so.
The world looks different to those who oppose Rule 32.1. They start
from the premise that a court of appeals should be free to decide how to
handle its judicial business as it sees fit, unless there are compelling reasons
to stop it from doing so. They say, "It is not the job of the Rules Committee
to tell us how to run our circuits, it is not their job to tell us how to get our
work done, and particularly at this point in time, when we are struggling to
deal with increasing caseloads with diminishing resources, when each
circuit needs to decide, given the local conditions of that circuit, how best to
handle its business. What's wrong here is the National Advisory
Committee telling us how to run our circuits. Only if they can come up
with compelling reasons should they be allowed to do so." So, for
opponents of Rule 32.1, it is the supporters of the Rule who have the burden
of proof, who have to come up with a good reason for depriving circuits of
their autonomy.
8. Letter from Judge Alex Kozinski, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to
Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules 2 (Jan. 16, 2004)
("When the people making the sausage tell you it's not safe for human consumption, it
seems strange indeed to have a committee in Washington tell people to go ahead and eat it
anyway.").
9. Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 15
(2002) (statement of Judge Alex Kozinski, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit)
("[T]he prohibition against citation of unpublished dispositions addresses a specific kind of
fraud on the deciding court-the illusion that the unpublished disposition has sufficient facts
and law to give the deciding court useful guidance.").
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So the question for this evening is this: Do such compelling reasons
exist? Are there compelling reasons to bar altogether or restrict the citation
of unpublished opinions or, alternatively, are there compelling reasons to
amend the Appellate Rules to force the circuits to allow attorneys to cite the
circuit's own unpublished opinions back to them?
For three different perspectives on these questions, we now turn to our
panel, beginning first with Judge Becker.
JUDGE BECKER: Thank you, Professor Schiltz.
As you will see, I do not understand all the Sturm und Drang. For me it
is not passionate, it is a matter of plain, simple logic. I support the adoption
of Rule 32.1 as described by Professor Schiltz. I will not discuss the Draft
Committee Note. Rather, I will limit myself to an accounting of the Third
Circuit experience, to comments on the objections raised to the Proposed
Rule 32.1, and the reasons that I favor the Proposed Rule.
First, a matter of nomenclature. I am not going to use the phrase
"unpublished opinions." As Professor Capra said, there ain't no such
thing-everything is published now. We put all of what we formerly called
unpublished opinions on the Web so anybody can get them. They are all
published. We refer to them as non-precedential opinions ("NPOs").
Speaking only for myself, that being the supreme affectation of an appellate
judge, I think that is a better nomenclature.
Notwithstanding the Sturm und Drang, citations to NPOs in the Third
Circuit are not frequent. We have permitted them for years and years and
years. Such citation has never created a problem for us. To the contrary,
when NPOs are cited, and they are from time to time, they have often been
useful in a number of respects.
First, they give us the benefit of the thinking of a previous panel and help
us to focus on or think through the issues. For busy judges this is a great
boon.
Second, they identify issues on which we should be writing a
precedential opinion. When an issue has been dealt with in an NPO and
comes up again, or again and again, that is a signal that we need to clarify
the law precedentially. There is a suggestion in the Committee materials,
the voluminous Committee materials, if you can look at them, that in
United States v. Rivera-Sanchez,10 the Ninth Circuit admitted that various
panels had issued at least twenty unpublished opinions resolving the same
unsettled issue of law at least three different ways before any precedential
opinion addressed the issue. Once or twice is too much. But if people can
cite NPOs to you, then you know there is an issue, there is a problem, and
you can clarify the law and save the lawyers and judges a lot of time.
Third, citations to NPOs also help district judges in the same way that
they help us. District judges know they are not bound by NPOs, they are
judges of Article Im, and they exercise independent judgment.
10. 222 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Now, I do acknowledge early on that there is one chink in the armor of
the Third Circuit, to my chagrin, and I am in the minority on this. We do
not cite non-precedential opinions in our opinions. Let me correct that.
Although lawyers can cite them to us and we consider them, we do not cite
our own non-precedential opinions in our opinions. I cite non-precedential
opinions of other circuits or unpublished opinions of district courts, but
because of the protocols that we agreed to in our retreat, I yielded and said,
"Okay, we won't cite our own," which I guess is a way of saying that we
are not being bound by Anastasoff-i.e., that we are not precedentially
bound by those opinions.
Now, let me turn to the Third Circuit practice in connection with NPOs.
We write on every counseled case. Eighty percent of our opinions-and I
think it is pretty similar to the national average-are NPOs. Most of our
opinions are not cursory, they are not sausage, they are not a fraud on the
public.
I love Judge Kozinski, he's got Philly roots, his wife is from
Philadelphia, he's a charming guy, but I can't imagine a judge of the Third
Article describing judicial work product of your own circuit, an opinion that
decided a case, as sausage and a fraud on the public. I mean it's just
typical. He wasn't serious. It's just rhetoric, it is just excess, and it reflects
the politicization of this issue, which has caused it to be delayed for so long,
which is the source of the huge outpouring of support for Judge Kozinski's
position from the district judges and lawyers of the Ninth Circuit, and it is
very unfortunate.
Our NPOs are not cursory. They average over seven pages. Because
they are primarily written for the parties, they often or usually do not set
forth all the facts, but some NPOs do and are fairly comprehensive. At all
events they uniformly set forth the ratio decidendi of the decision. These
opinions are prepared in chambers under the close supervision of the judge.
They may be drafted by clerks, although actually in my chambers I draft
them myself. Why do I draft them myself? If I gave them to a clerk, they
would spend too much time on them, you know, I'd get a great big, long
thing. So I do them myself and I get a short, succinct opinion, and then I
give them to the clerks and let them edit them. But whoever does them,
they are carefully reviewed and edited by the judge, and they are
sufficiently lucid that their citation can be valuable.
All of our NPOs in counsel cases, as I said, are placed online and, hence,
are reported in the Federal Appendix. We have not been placing our pro se
cases online, but I believe that sometime in the spring, under a federal act
whose name someone will supply me with will require us to put those
online as well.
PROFESSOR SCHILTZ: The E-Government Act.11
JUDGE BECKER: That will have some stuff that will not be all that
useful to lawyers, but nonetheless we are going to have to do it.
11. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3501 (2004).
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Now, let me contrast our practice with comments made to the Committee
about practice elsewhere. I refer to representations that: (1) unpublished
opinions are hurriedly drafted by staff and clerks and are written in loose,
sloppy language; (2) because they receive little attention from judges, these
opinions often contain statements of law that are imprecise and inaccurate;
(3) judges are careful to make sure that the result is correct, but they spend
very little time reviewing the opinion itself; (4) citing unpublished opinions
might mislead lower courts and others about the view of its circuit's judges;
and (5) it will be the rare unpublished opinion that will precisely and
comprehensively describe the views of any of the panel's judges. These
comments reflect the views of the Ninth Circuit, where the principal
complaints about Rule 32.1 come from, and they should not be proud of
these accounts.
But they do not reflect the practice of the Third Circuit, where the judges
are involved. Indeed, we often do dissents and concurrences from NPOs,
and when we do that we circulate them, because we have a prefiling
circulation practice, and we circulate them to the full court.
The judges, notwithstanding the representations elsewhere, do not
consider NPOs a burden. They do not take that much time to prepare.
There is no delay in processing. They are typically filed promptly after the
regularly scheduled disposition date. Most are on non-argued cases, but
many are on argued cases.
Now let me turn to the criticisms of the citations of NPOs. First, the
judges' time, that NPOs are burdensome to prepare. I do not think so, as I
have said. Is there a moral obligation to distinguish NPOs in opinions? I
don't think so. We do not have to distinguish every precedential case in our
opinions, and we do not do so.
Are too many NPOs cited? As I have said, it is not our experience. Our
bar is responsible. It does not want to waste its time or our own. If a
useless case is cited, it takes a nanosecond to discover that fact and the
citation is ignored.
Is there undue consumption of the lawyers' time? I do not think so.
Same considerations at work. It doesn't take them long to discard an NPO
of no utility. But if they find one that is persuasive, then it is worth the
time.
And how about the argument of bloating of the corpus juris? Well, that
is beyond our control. NPOs are online in the Federal Appendix. Congress
has passed the E-Government Act. The bottom line is the lawyers want
them, the market has spoken, and there is nothing we can do about it. And,
indeed, NPOs help lawyers in other ways. NPOs can help lawyers in
evaluating a case for settlement purposes. That is something that appellate
judges do not think about much.
And what about the rationale of Rule 32.1? The citation issue was not a
real one for us until we jettisoned our former practice of deciding about half
our cases by judgment orders, or at least forty percent, and Professor Schiltz
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described them as essentially one-line dispositions. In most of these cases,
there was no oral argument.
When I became Chief Judge of the Third Circuit in 1998, I persuaded my
colleagues that we owe a greater duty to our colleagues of the bar and to
their clients. You represent the appellants, you do not get oral argument,
you get a one-line disposition-boom! "Affirmed." You are out. I viewed
it as a matter of respect. I viewed the change as a matter of respect for the
bar, respect for our profession. I mean, judges are nothing but lawyers with
robes on, a robe and a commission, and lawyers are part of our profession.
I think we owe respect to our profession. I also viewed it not just as a
matter of respect for our profession, but as a matter of responsibility and
accountability. My colleagues agreed, and we ceased writing judgment
orders and started writing NPOs in every case.
I say that by way of background. I understand that is not the subject
here, although it is to the extent that some have advocated that what we
ought to do is write more precedential opinions and then do more judgment
orders, which I think is an abomination. But I view it essentially the same
way. How can we say, we judges, to members of our
profession-remember, we work for them, we work for their clients and the
public, not vice versa-that they cannot cite what we have written? We are
not bound by an NPO. I do not know how you can say to a lawyer, "You
cannot cite what we have written." Leaving aside constitutional issues, it is
a prudential matter, it is a matter of fairness, it is a matter of decency, it is a
matter of respect. I do not know how we can do that to the bar.
My final point: why a national rule as opposed to letting each circuit
decide? Well, the zeitgeist for the last several decades, animated by
Congress as well as the Judicial Conference, is in favor of national laws.
Local rules are for experimentation and innovation. But that principle does
not apply here. We are not dealing with experimentation and innovation.
Neither are we dealing with an exception for local culture, which is a local
and not a circuit-wide geographic notion.
We are all affected by a national rule. There is a rule to change the en
banc quorum rule that altered the Third Circuit rule. We didn't like it, but
what could we do? We are prepared to live by new and different national
rules.
Moreover, the law practice is national. At our sittings in Philadelphia,
we constantly have lawyers from New York, Chicago, California, and
elsewhere. Procedure is complicated enough. They can look up a local
rule, but they are unsure of its operation. A national rule is better.
So as I said, the strongest reasons for a national rule are those I have
described above: our duty to the bar and public, respect for the bar and
litigants, responsibility and accountability, and the unreasonableness of
saying to the lawyers that you cannot cite what we have written.
One final comment: where does it go from here? I do not know. It has
become terribly politicized. I had hoped that the Appellate Rules
Committee, having referred it to the Standing Committee, that the Standing
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Committee would simply refer it to the Judicial Conference. But the
political forces were so strong that it was decided, "Well, let's hold it up
and let's do a study." So the Federal Judicial Center is doing a study. I
don't know what the study is going to show, but I hope that one of these
days it will come out, and it will be up or down, and I hope it will be up,
because this thing has gone on too long.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Judge Leval.
JUDGE LEVAL: As my wonderful colleague Ed Becker illustrated,
passions on this issue run very high, and everybody feels that their side is
justified by reason and common sense.
When lawyers, including judges, get their oar in the water, the reasons
given to support and oppose whatever issue is under discussion multiply
and proliferate.
I am here to defend the position that circuits should be permitted to make
their own choice whether they will allow citation of what we call "summary
orders." I doubt that anything that I say, or anyone else on this panel says,
will change the minds of those who have already passionately committed
themselves to one side or the other.
Furthermore, I will probably disappoint my constituents, those who are
passionately on the side of non-citability, because I do not purport to have
arguments that will blow the opposition out of the water. I do not purport
to have irrefutable arguments in favor of non-citability of summary orders,
and I concede that there is considerable merit in some of the positions taken
on the other side. The position that a litigant should always be allowed to
remind a court of its precedents and call to the court's attention its prior
actions, is unquestionably a respectable one.
There is also much theoretical merit in the more extreme position taken
by our much-esteemed, wonderful late colleague Richard Arnold, that every
court decision should be deemed a binding precedent. Judge Arnold dealt
with a case in which his court had decided one way in a non-binding order
and then felt free to decide the other way in a binding precedent. In
Richard's view, this was not constitutional. It was not an appropriate way
for a court to behave. There is a lot to be said for that view. Indeed, it is far
more rational than the proposition that court actions should be citable but
not precedential, which is a rather uncomfortable and odd position.
There are reasons that support having orders not be citable. I see this as a
conflict between theory and practice. The theory favors Judge Arnold's
view. The practice favors allowing a non-citation rule for orders issued in
appropriate cases, so long as the practice is restricted to the appropriate
cases and is not abused.
The Ninth Circuit is not alone in having a non-citation rule. The Second
Circuit, and others as well, have a non-citation rule. We do it because we
believe that, with virtually no negative effect, it permits us to produce a
better quality of justice.
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Although I would never argue that such a rule is ideal, there are strong
pragmatic reasons that support it, which depend on facts pertaining to our
calendar and work. Fact number one is that judges are very much
overworked. They put in very long hours. Because they are putting in very
long hours to get their work done, it is not an option for them to put in more
hours. There simply are not more hours. The only way they could cause a
significant change in their workload would be by reallocation of their
time-taking time away from the opinions in matters of precedential
importance and giving it instead to matters of no precedential importance.
Fact number two: while it is true that all cases are very important to the
litigants, not all cases are important for their precedential value. Many
cases, indeed a great majority of the cases, fall comfortably under
previously established precedent, so that the explanation of the judgment
should not alter, enlighten, or in any way change the declared law of the
circuit.
Other cases, a far smaller number, are of importance as precedent. These
cases are cases of which the explanation of the decision will involve new
understandings, new explanations, new declarations, and interpretations of
legal doctrine.
Fact number three is how difficult and time-consuming is the writing of
precedential judicial opinions. This is especially so when it is done by a
higher court, whose opinions serve as precedent. The explanations in such
judicial decisions must be very, very clearly thought through, very clearly
presented, lest they cause harmful confusion in the law. Inevitably we fail
in that undertaking. I send my colleagues a draft opinion, which I think is
pellucidly clear and logical. My colleagues send it back, commenting that
my explanations are confusing, misleading, or in some cases just plain
wrong. And often they are right. So I need to try again, and I work on it
more, and it goes through thirty or forty drafts.
It is a very, very time-consuming practice process. The time-consuming
care is extremely important because we can do great mischief if the verbal
formulations of our explanations are not sufficiently well thought out and
clear. We make a mess of the law; by making a mess of the law, we make a
mess of society.
So the smallest confusions in precedential opinions can be of serious
consequence. Litigants pounce on them, to use an inept formulation to the
litigants' advantage in the next case. It is very much worth our effort to do
all that we can to avoid confusions of that sort.
So we in the Second Circuit faced the question: How do we best allocate
our time to produce the best quality of precedential opinions that we can?
And we answered the question this way: We said, "Let's divide the cases
into two piles. There is a pile, a small pile, representing the cases of
precedential importance. That is where we will put our time, that is where
we will devote our care and attention to making those opinions as good as
we can. Then there is this other pile, a pretty big pile, of cases that do not
have precedential importance. We will rule that orders disposing of those
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cases are non-citable, and we will dispose of them very rapidly." Why do
we do them rapidly? The answer is obvious: in order to leave ourselves
more time to do the precedentially important cases with care.
So what happens to these non-citable orders? They are very hastily done.
As a result, they are sometimes ambiguous, overstated, and misleading in
their legal explanations. Alex Kozinski, a wonderful person, who uses
language in a marvelously imaginative way, likens them to sausage not fit
for human consumption. The fact is that if you are producing non-citable
summary orders for the purpose of saving your time for the precedentially
important opinions, those summary orders will not be good. They may
contain confusing language capable of causing mischief.
It is not that we are deciding cases incorrectly. It is not that we are
deciding cases inconsistently, as in the case that Judge Arnold faced, where
inconsistent decisions were being made on the same facts, concealing one
under the non-precedential. That should not be done. If that were being
done, it would be an abuse of the non-citable or non-precedential summary
order.
What is happening is rather that, in the hasty preparation of these non-
citable summary orders, our explanations are sometimes imperfect. That
sounds terrible. Judges intentionally allow imperfection? Well, this is the
real world. You do not have time to do everything as well as you are
capable of doing it.
So how to deal with the problem? The solution we have adopted is one
that says: choose the cases that are important as precedent. Give them the
time, and do them as well as you can. Save time from the cases that have
no precedential importance and make them non-citable.
Now, every attorney who practices in our court has the same complaint:
"I had a case where the court had said something in a summary order that
would have helped my brief, and I wasn't allowed to cite it." It's an
impassioned complaint. They bitterly resent our rule.
I suggest that the complaint is somewhat illusory because if attorneys
were allowed to cite the summary order, the greater probability is that what
they wanted to cite would not have been there. Why would it not have been
there? For several reasons.
First, if summary orders were citable, the court would have taken greater
care, to prepare them more carefully. The misformulation would have been
spotted and corrected or removed. Alternatively, the court would be
slimming down its orders to a bare few words, "Affirmed," or just a little
bit more than that, so they would not really be of much use to anyone.
Under either alternative, the lawyer would not have the morsel to cite, and
the quality of justice would have suffered.
Now, if the caseload in our circuit were what it was back at the time
when Mike and I clerked for Judge Friendly, the considerations would be
different. Caseloads then were very much lighter, and the Second Circuit
had all the time in the world to deal with all of its cases. I would be on the
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other side of this dispute. In those circumstances, there would be no
justification for a non-cite rule or for a non-precedential rule.
But as our court is today, the non-cite rule simply allows us to produce a
better quality of justice, with very little downside.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Judge Boudin.
JUDGE BOUDIN: You might think, with a position for eloquently
stated, and a position against dramatically stated, there would be no third
position that would be possible. But my own, in a nutshell, is that it does
not matter very much.
[Laughter.]
But the topic is one of some interest, not for its own sake, but because
there is a set of adjacent problems that it suggests that are extremely
interesting and have practical consequences that are considerable. A word
on each of these points.
The reason why it does not, to my mind, make much difference whether
you have the Proposed Rule or whether you follow the First, Second, or
Third Circuit approach to unpublished opinions, is that in practice the
results are pretty much the same. The unpublished opinions would not, in
my view, change very much if they were to be cited. These cases which are
published do not change very much whether the lawyers are allowed to cite
unpublished opinions. This is not speculation; it is the experience of almost
everyone who has seen the circuits operating differently, or who, like my
own, have switched more or less from a rule strongly discouraging or
limiting citation of unpublished opinions to a rule which, although
somewhat disguised in practice, lets them in whenever a lawyer feels like
citing them. There has been almost no difference in the number of cases in
which unpublished opinions are cited.
There has been virtually no difference in the outcome, either with respect
to the unpublished opinions, which can now be cited, or to the published
opinions, in which the unpublished opinions now can be cited. That is the
practical reality.
If it doesn't matter very much in real life, this is necessarily a debate that
is of some abstract interest but probably is not going to change the world
very significantly however it comes out. The adjacent issues, however, are
very interesting. Let me give you just three, which can be pursued later if
you would like.
The first is that while the opportunity of the lawyer to cite unpublished
opinions may not have any effect, the question whether those opinions have
to be given precedential weight is a matter of extreme importance, and it is
implicated because if one were to take seriously the view that all opinions
ought to be available and to be taken seriously in the courts of appeals,
whether they were published or unpublished, you are moving in the
direction of encouraging, and perhaps ultimately requiring, courts to give
the unpublished opinions precedential weight, or at least that is a possible
line of extension.
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If you think for a moment about what a rule would look like, you will see
its implications. Suppose the rule were "all unpublished opinions have to
be allowed to be cited and they have to be given equal precedential weight."
That would indeed affect how courts spent their time, probably in the
direction suggested by Judge Leval, requiring much more work on
unpublished opinions, or in writing very, very brief unpublished opinions so
that they could not be misused at all.
Precedential weight, of course, is not an "on" or "off' switch. The reality
is that opinions get very different weight depending on all kinds of
circumstances: who wrote them, how recently, how persuasive they are. It
is not just published or unpublished. But denominating an opinion as
binding the panel does have considerable significance, and indeed, that
would raise a constitutional problem that would be of great interest if the
Congress or the Rules Committee ever sought to prescribe weight.
The second adjacent problem that I find very interesting is that what are
either perceptions, or to some extent misperceptions, about unpublished
opinions have a reality of their own simply because they become widely
held. That reality is an argument for or against the adoption of a rule of this
kind.
If no one cared about this rule, there seem to be pretty good arguments
offered by Judge Leval why one might want to leave the status quo pretty
much intact. You can get through unpublished opinions more quickly.
They are not sausage-that is an overstatement-they are generally
reasonably detailed, reasonably reliable, but some of the time they do not
have the complete balance and polish of the published opinions.
There is some argument, particularly because those cases are chosen
because they do not seem to be making new law, for putting them aside and
not fussing as much about them. But if the public develops the perception
that there is something sinister or improper or dangerous about this practice,
that is a reality which you have to take into account.
The vocal law professors, the lawyers, whom Pierre has described as
being very upset at not being able to cite the opinions, and others have, to
my mind, made a public case that really cannot be undone at this stage. So
taking that into account, it seems to me there is pretty good argument for
giving way, recognizing that the whole controversy didn't matter very much
to begin with, and taking the softer course of saying, "Cite them if you
want, we will do what we want with them," which is more or less what the
First Circuit has now done.
This problem of perception becoming reality, of course, is not limited to
this case. That is why it is an interesting problem. For example, the entire
cumbersome, expensive, overwrought set of rules that govern judicial
ethics, misconduct, and disclosure reports is a product of this perception
becoming reality. About seventy-five percent of it could be junked, at great
benefit to everyone (Kozinski has actually written quite interestingly on this
subject), if everyone were not afraid, and with reason, that any alteration in
the direction of reduction, any lessening of overrigid rules, would be
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regarded as a confession that misconduct was occurring that we are no
longer willing to police.
So this is an ongoing problem in life. It probably affects foreign policy
and economic policy and everything else. It plays a major role with respect
to this set of rules.
The final point, it seems to me perhaps the most important adjacent issue,
is that this controversy, to the extent that it has substance, really presents a
different question that is worth considering, which is essentially how much
you are willing to pay for the extra polish and perfection.
Though the unpublished opinions do not seem to me that much weaker,
they are considerably more concise. They typically leave out facts. They
leave out a lot of balancing information and discussion that you would put
in if you were trying to write a complete explanation that you expected to
guide future panels and all the district courts in your circuit. I do not think
it is a drastic difference, but it is a difference.
Now, think about it this way. A typical judge in my circuit works on
about 400 merits cases a year, which means the judge is responsible for
writing about a third of them. As a practical matter, I am more or less
responsible for 130 opinions. About sixty percent will probably be
unpublished.
If someone said to me that my load would be cut in half, which might
take you back to where Judge Friendly was when Pierre and I were law
clerks, it would be possible to devote to all of those cases, including the
unpublished ones, the kind of care and polish and completeness that is
available for the published decisions.
The cost of cutting my workload in half would be about one million
dollars, because that is, very crudely I think, the cost of an Article 1II judge
after salary, three or four law clerks, a secretary or two, some office space,
pension, so forth and so on. The question you have to ask yourself is: is it
worth it to get that extra polish?
It would be unfair to restrict the caseload reduction to me. There are
about one thousand federal judges. A thousand federal judges times one
million dollars is about one billion dollars a year. And so you have to ask
yourself, if you would be adding a measure of perfection, possibly a few
changed outcomes in close cases, is that the right way to spend the
one billion dollars, or would it be better used on health care or cancer
research or better education for first graders?
It is a serious question, in a way it is the underlying question, when you
talk about the concerns that are posed by the weaker or less-polished
unpublished opinions, because, one way or another, when you say you want
them to be treated as if they were the polished, published opinions, you are
really saying in the end that we ought to be spending more money, more
judge time, on cases, and the question is: is it worth it?
PROFESSOR CAPRA: Professor Schiltz.
PROFESSOR SCHILTZ: Let me start the discussion by going back to
the Ninth Circuit point. We got letters from virtually every judge in the
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Ninth Circuit, and many of them pointed out that it is the first time that all
the judges in the Ninth Circuit had ever agreed on anything. We brought
them together.
But what the Ninth Circuit told us-and I would be curious to hear the
judges' reaction to this-is they described for us their process for issuing
unpublished opinions. I obviously have no personal knowledge, but this
was pretty consistently described by the Ninth Circuit judges.
The process is this: A panel of three judges will in a space of about three
days decide about 150 cases, fifty a day. They will not read the briefs, they
will not read the records. They will show up in a room. A staff attorney
will briefly describe the case, briefly describe the opinion the staff attorney
has drafted to dispose of the case. There might be some discussion, but the
judges will say, "okay," and they will move on to the next case. So in many
of the cases the judges will not have read any briefs, nor even read the
opinion that is going out under the Ninth Circuit's name.
My questions are: First of all, what do you think of this? What would
Judge Friendly think of this? I ask that seriously. If you put Judge Friendly
in the Ninth Circuit today, would he resign, having to do that for a living?
Secondly, is this the future, if Congress continues to give you fewer
resources to deal with more cases? And third, are those opinions that the
Ninth Circuit is issuing in that setting really better than simple, one-line
orders? In other words, if judges agree on a result but do not agree on an
opinion, and maybe do not even read the opinion, would it not be better to
simply issue what they do agree on, and that is the result?
JUDGE BECKER: I am not going to speak for Judge Friendly because,
unlike Judge Leval and Judge Boudin, I didn't clerk for Judge Friendly,
although I will point out that, like Judge Kozinski, Judge Friendly's wife
was from Philadelphia.
[Laughter.]
But I will say that what we should do is bottle the remarks that you have
just made and bring them before the Senate Judiciary Committee as Exhibit
A as to why the Ninth Circuit desperately needs to be split, because that is
no way-
PROFESSOR SCHILTZ: Well, if we didn't have enough controversy,
that will-
JUDGE BECKER: That's no way to run a railroad. I defer to Judge
Leval and Judge Boudin as to what Judge Friendly would think.
JUDGE LEVAL: I would say that Judge Friendly would not be happy
with that state of affairs, and I think no judge would be happy with that
state of affairs. I am sure that the judges of the Ninth Circuit are not happy
with it.
It is easy enough to say that it is a terrible way to adjudicate cases, but
what do you do when you have cases of that volume? You have to find
some way of dealing with them.
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We do not dispose of our summary orders that way in the Second Circuit.
It is a very different procedure, with the judges very much more involved.
But we do not have the volume that they have, and when you have that kind
of volume, it simply does not make sense to turn up your nose and say,
"Yuck, that's no way for a judge to be disposing of cases." How should
those judges dispose of those cases? And if the way they must dispose of
them is one that simply does not allow, because of human inability to deal
with overwhelming volume, the kind of judicial attention to them that
guarantees a reasonably reliable expression of the result, isn't it better that
they not be citable? The process is not beautiful, it is not admirable,
nobody likes it, but you've got to deal with reality.
JUDGE BOUDIN: What is actually going on in the Ninth Circuit is
unclear from the description, but you want to be very careful about drawing
the horror show inference that is implied by the way the description is put.
In my circuit, the unpublished opinions are pretty much like the
published ones except that staff attorneys do initial drafts and there isn't
oral argument. The judges are responsible in the end for drafting an
opinion. They have the briefs, they have the record, and they do what they
need to do in producing an opinion, which is the judge's opinion, even
though it is usually issued as a per curiam.L
But let me ask you to think about the comparison of what Pat has said the
Ninth Circuit does with what might happen in my office in an argued case.
A couple of weeks after the argument, the clerk would come in and say,
"I'm about to start doing a draft for you of an opinion that was argued three
weeks ago," which at that point I will not remember in any detail. I have
400 cases a year to work on.
JUDGE LEVAL: It only takes me three days to forget them.
JUDGE BOUDIN: I will say to the clerk, "What's it about?" and the
clerk will give me a two- or three-minute summary. I can usually say to the
clerk-I've been doing this for forty years, I've been dealing with appellate
problems, I know how to handle most of them-I will say to the clerk, "I
think the short answer to that is such and such. Go write it up."
I will then take the clerk's draft, which will come back a week or two
later, and over a weekend I will write my own draft using the clerk's as a
bench memo, because I think the problem through by typing. And it is my
words in the end. I like my words better than the clerk's. And I can type
very fast because I went to a progressive school where they thought typing
was what was important. Forty years later, with computers, it turned out to
be right.
Now, if you think about my description of what just happened, it is true I
read the briefs at quite high speed before the argument, I listened to the
argument, which was usually rather brief. A lot of cases, including argued
cases, can be handled pretty effectively by having the law clerk say, "Here's
what's going on, Judge," and the judge saying in answer to that, "I've seen
this problem before and this is the way to handle that problem. Do it that
way."
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So the notion that there is something really infernal about the judges
coming into a room and listening to these oral presentations-you have to
reserve judgment about that. If the cases are the right kind and are selected
according to criteria that produce really easy cases-and boy, are there a lot
of easy cases among these 400 that I have, easy once you have digested
them quickly-and if the judge is going to take responsibility for reading
the explanation, and the explanation often has a benefit to the lawyer and
the client, even if it isn't very polished, in reassuring everybody that the
case has been considered and that there is an answer to it beyond "yes" or
"no," you might not take quite so hostile a view of the Ninth Circuit.
Remember that an awful lot of law is made, law in the sense of
outcomes, which as all unpublished cases are, when somebody gets up in a
courtroom and says to a crucial piece of evidence, "Objection," and the
judge says, "Overruled." So if it's an appellate court and we are talking
about non-precedential opinions, I would wait before expressing too much
horror.
PROFESSOR SCHILTZ: Understand that I am not expressing horror at
the Ninth Circuit, in the sense they are in an impossible position, and none
of us can envy their position. What I am getting at is the strange
persistence of the insistence on issuing eight-page, clerk-written drafts.
Why not issue a one-line opinion? If you say to judges, "Why not issue
one-line opinions?" they say, "Because the parties are entitled to know why
we decided the case that way." If you say, "Why not let them cite those
then?" "Well, because that's not why we decided the case. Those aren't
really our views." It is this odd persistence of this.
JUDGE BOUDIN: That is a parody of both sides of the argument. This
is why the economics profession has had such an impact on legal teaching.
It is the great insight that almost all things are tradeoffs. The five or six
paragraphs do not have it perfectly and they may lack the context to make
them useful precedents, but if you ask the lawyers and the clients, they
would rather have a couple of paragraphs, I think, saying, "We listened to
your arguments and here is why we rejected them," assuming there is
anything to them.
And as for clerk-written drafts, I write my own opinions. It is probably a
waste of time doing it that way. Great judges have used their law clerks'
drafts and marked them up, and I am sure in the Ninth Circuit they take
these clerk drafts and it must be that they are approved by the judges before
they go out, and I'll bet some of them were altered.
PROFESSOR SCHILTZ: Let me ask about the future. As Judge Becker
mentioned, the status right now of this is that the Federal Judicial Center is
studying it. What the Standing Committee directed it to do is to go out and
see if there is any evidence supporting or refuting the predictions made by
opponents of Rule 32.1. There are lots of state and federal courts that had
very restrictive rules that liberalized their rules, and we can study to see
whether a lot of these predictions have come true. Have the one-line orders
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increased? Has the time for judges to put out opinions increased? Have
attorneys cited a lot of unpublished opinions?
Do you judges think that empirical evidence can make any difference in
this debate? In the Second Circuit, for example, the majority of judges sent
a letter opposing it. If the Federal Judicial Center says, "We have studied
the courts where they allow citation and we have seen no evidence that the
things you fear are true," are they persuadable, or will the view be that the
Second Circuit is different enough that you just cannot extrapolate the
results to your circuit?
JUDGE LEVAL: I would never want to be in the position of saying that
evidence doesn't matter, but how much does it matter? Judge Boudin is
completely correct in saying that public perception matters. Driven by the
anger of attorneys who have not been allowed to cite something that they
wanted to cite, and have resorted to hyperbole to convince the American
public that something sinister is going on, there is a public perception that
has to be dealt with.
I am not very optimistic about the results. I think probably that requiring
citability will be forced on us in time. I do not think it will be a good thing.
I do not think it will be a terrible thing. I agree with Judge Boudin that the
whole issue is overinflated and isn't as important as people think it is. But
citability will not improve the overall quality of justice.
Let me add something: I think that part of the trouble comes from the
judges themselves. In my view, the correct way to approach the writing of
orders in a case without precedential importance is something between the
one word "affirmed," and the very discursive, pontifical manner, heavy-on-
citations, heavy-on-propositions-of-law, that is often used.
When law clerks prepare drafts of orders, they often want their product to
compare favorably with the opinions of Holmes, Brandeis, Boudin, and
Becker. That is where the problem lies. Orders in such cases are not
designed for posterity. They are essentially for the parties. The purpose in
writing them is to give the parties an idea why we decided the case the way
we did. They should be written concisely, not in the manner of a legal
treatise. Very, very brief. The parties will understand the order, but it will
not be useful as precedent.
If judges and the law clerks were to approach the drafting of orders that
way, rather than inflating them unnecessarily with declared propositions of
law, I think the problem would almost go away.
JUDGE BECKER: I would just say that nobody is going to bother to cite
these cursory opinions, so it is a nonproblem in another sense. If you
permit citation of unpublished and non-precedential opinions, lawyers are
not going to bother citing these cursory jobs. There's no sense wasting
their time.
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